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government of refugees: Biopolitical care and racism
in the European refugee crisis
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Abstract
The notion of humanitarian government has been increasingly employed to describe the simulta-
neous and conﬂicting deployment of humanitarianism and security in the government of ‘precarious
lives’ such as refugees. This article argues that humanitarian government should also be understood
as the biopolitical government of host populations through the humanitarian government of refu-
gees. In particular, it explores how the biopolitical governmentality of the UK decision to suspend
search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean in 2014, and the British rejection and German
welcoming of Syrian refugees primarily concern the biological and emotional care of the British and
German populations. To this end, the article analyses how dynamics of inclusion/exclusion of
refugees have been informed by a biopolitical racism that redraws the boundary between ‘valuable’
(to be included) and ‘not valuable’ (to be excluded) lives according to the refugees’ capacity to
enhance the biological and emotional well-being of host populations. This discussion aims to
contribute to three interrelated ﬁelds of research – namely, humanitarian government, biopolitical
governmentality, and responses to the European refugee crisis – by exploring how biopolitics has
shaped the British and German responses to the crisis and how it encompasses more meanings and
rationalities than currently recognised by existing scholarship on humanitarian government.
Keywords
Humanitarian Government; Biopolitical Governmentality; Emotional Care; European Refugee Crisis;
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Introduction
To date, one of the most powerful images of the European refugee crisis is the picture of three-year-
old Alan Kurdi (initially named as Aylan Kurdi), a Syrian boy of Kurdish ethnic background, who
drowned off the coast of the Turkish town of Bodrum on 2 September 2015 together with his
brother and mother during his family’s attempt to reach Europe. The picture of his lifeless body lying
on the shore sparked a large outcry all over the world on the tragedy of Syrian refugees. It triggered a
strong emotional response from media and public opinion, particularly in Europe, resulting in calls
for more open borders and welcoming immigration policies. Shortly after Alan’s death, then UK
Prime Minister David Cameron vowed that his country would ‘fulﬁl’ its ‘moral responsibilities’ by
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taking in 20,000 Syrian refugees over a period of ﬁve years directly from camps in Syria’s neigh-
bouring countries.1 Cameron explained that the refugees would be selected on the basis of need: ‘We
will take the most vulnerable: … disabled children, … women who have been raped, … men who
have suffered torture’.2 This resolution was welcomed, but also criticised for comparing poorly with
other European countries. Germany, in particular, had taken in 18,000 Syrian refugees in the single
weekend prior to Cameron’s pledge, and, following Alan’s death, pledged to take up to 800,000
refugees a year for several years.
While the UK’s and Germany’s responses to the plight of Syrian refugees may be partially accounted
for as governments bowing to public pressures, they also raise questions on their underlying
governmental rationalities. In particular, why did the UK commit to taking only a small number
of refugees and, most of all, only sick children, women who had been raped and men who had
suffered torture, whereas Germany pledged to open its borders to millions of Syrians, irrespective
of their gender, age, or physical condition? Are the British and the German cases expressions
of different governmentalities or is it possible to discern in their contending responses similar
governmental rationalities? Can these rationalities be considered an instantiation of what has
recently been labelled ‘humanitarian government’, namely the simultaneous deployment of logics
of ‘securitization and humanitarianism’3 in the government of disenfranchised subjects such as
refugees and undocumented or ‘irregular’ migrants’?4 This article will strive to address these
questions.
The notion of humanitarian government has been the object of growing scholarly attention. For Didier
Fassin, this concept designates a mode of governing ‘precarious lives’ – such as ‘the lives of the unemployed
and the asylum seekers, … of sick immigrants and people with Aids, … of disaster victims and victims of
conﬂict’5 – which does not exhaust itself in practices of care. Humanitarian government encompasses
dynamics of depoliticisation, as the language of compassion and emotions turns ‘domination’ into
‘misfortune’, ‘injustice’ into ‘suffering’, and ‘violence’ into ‘trauma’;6 practices of subjectiﬁcation, with the
construction of a ‘new humanity’ made of individuals who are legitimate as long as they are recognised as
‘suffering bodies’;7 logics of securitisation of space, bodies, and populations, which have turned border
1 Cited in ‘David Cameron urges EU countries to follow UK’s lead on refugees’, BBC News (14 September 2015),
available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34242346} accessed 24 January 2016.
2 Ibid.
3 Adrian Little and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats, saving lives, securing subjects: Humanitarian
borders in Europe and Australia’, European Journal of International Relations, 10 August (2016), doi:
10.1177/1354066116661227, pp. 1–24.
4 In this article I will use the term ‘migrants’, ‘undocumented migrants’, ‘irregular migrants’, and ‘refugees’
interchangeably. The element of voluntariness that traditionally distinguishes migrants (whether ‘regular’,
‘irregular’, or ‘undocumented’) from refugees has become the object of growing criticism as it may be extremely
difﬁcult to ascertain on the ground, with the effect that these categories are extremely blurred and often
untenable (see Jørgen Carling, ‘Refugees are also migrants. And all migrants matter’, Border Criminologies,
available at: {http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/refugees-are-also-migrants} accessed 16 February 2016).
By using these terms interchangeably (and with inverted commas as in relation to ‘irregular migrants’) my goal
is to ‘denaturalise’ what are ultimately ‘contingent subject position’ dependent upon dominant power/
knowledge regimes (see Little and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats’, p. 20, fn. 1).
5 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2012), p. 4.
6 Ibid., p. 6.
7 Miriam Ticktin, Casualties of Care: Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France (Berkeley:





crossing ‘into a matter of life and death’;8 forms of autoimmunisation, namely targeting what is ostensibly
being protected, as in the case of the ‘stop the boats’ policy in Australia, which claims to save lives by not
saving lives in order to discourage ‘irregular’ migrants from undertaking dangerous sea voyages;9 and
practices of (re)bordering, resulting in new rationalities of inclusion/exclusion and in the progressive
hardening of borders for ‘able-bodied migrants’.10 Ultimately, humanitarian government entails an
expansion and penetration of power as it ‘extends the reach of the state to govern more bodies (e.g., the
sick and injured) and more spaces (e.g., hospitals)’.11
Some of these dynamics may contribute to explaining British responses to the refugee crisis: caring for
a small number of ‘sick bodies’ while hardening the borders for those ‘able-bodied migrants’ who take
matters into their own hands by attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Similarly, the simultaneous
deployment of logics of ‘securitization and humanitarianism’ could be observed in the UK decision to
withdraw its support for search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean in October 2014. Turning
the UK commitment from saving lives to border patrolling was presented as a strategy to discourage
‘irregular’ migrants from undertaking the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean and thus as a
way of saving lives. Nonetheless, the concept of humanitarian government does not seem capable to
account for the German openness, where the humanitarian logic may seem to have transcended the
security component. Hence, should the British case be considered one of humanitarian government and
the German case one of humanitarianism tout court? Or is it possible to advance a different inter-
pretation of the British and German policies towards the refugee crisis beyond existing accounts of
humanitarianism and humanitarian government?
This article embraces this latter perspective. It contends that the British and German different responses
to Syrian refugees can be conceptualised as the expression of the same governmental rationality the
focus of which has not been just the ‘precarious lives’ of undocumented migrants, but the lives of host
populations. Accordingly, my argument is that humanitarian government does not solely entail the
government and care of disenfranchised collectivities such as refugees, but also the government and
care of host populations through the humanitarian government of refugees. From this perspective,
I will argue that the British pledge to take in 20,000 Syrian refugees should be accounted for as a way
of promoting a self-understanding of Britain as just, moral and compassionate, and therefore, as a
biopolitical way of promoting and enhancing the emotional life of its population. For Germany,
considerations of justice and compassion have contributed to reproduce a self-understanding of
Germany as caring and committed, and have been accompanied by an appreciation of Syrian refugees
as an overall young and skilled workforce that can support the German welfare system. Accordingly,
the dissolution of German borders for hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees should be understood
as a form of biopolitical care of both the emotional andmaterial well-being of the German population.
This article aims to contribute to three interrelated ﬁelds of research: namely, humanitarian government,
biopolitical governmentality, and responses to the European refugee crisis. In particular, it aims to
broaden the meaning and scope of the notion of humanitarian government by theorising it as a
8 William Walters, ‘Foucault and frontiers: Notes on the birth of the humanitarian border’, in Ulrich Bröckling,
Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke (eds), Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges
(London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 138–64 (p. 138).
9 Little and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats’.
10 Ticktin, Casualties of Care; see also Fassin, Humanitarian Reason.
11 Jill M. Williams, ‘From humanitarian exceptionalism to contingent care: Care and enforcement at the
humanitarian border’, Political Geography, 47 (2015), pp. 11–20 (p. 12).




Foucauldian biopolitical governmentality that has as its object host populations. With the term ‘bio-
political governmentality’, I understand a rationality of government that aims to biopolitically enhance
the lives of the population under power’s control both in biological and emotional terms. Hence, my
primary interest in this article is not in governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’12 and the promotion
of forms of self-government, but in governmentality as the power that ‘teaches the subjects in its care
about what counts as real, and what they themselves really are, in order to better govern them by letting
them govern themselves’.13 My interest, in other words, is in governmentality as the promotion of
positive forms of self-understanding and self-appreciation – through biological and emotional biopolitical
rationalities of care –which are the condition of possibility for forms of self-government.14Humanitarian
government makes the decision of which refugees need to be welcomed and which ones need to be
rejected a function of the biopolitical care of the populations of the countries that accept them. This
biopolitical governmentality, I will show, rests on a ‘differentialist’ understanding of racism that draws
on, but partially transcends, traditional accounts of racism based on nationality, ethnicity, religion,
colour, gender, and alleged intractable cultural differences. This biopolitical racism redraws the boundary
between ‘valuable’ (to be included) and ‘not valuable’ lives (to be excluded) according to the refugees’
capacity to enhance the biological and emotional well-being of host populations.
This argument also aims to contribute to existing debates on biopolitics in international relations.
Most of these debates have focused on ‘the emergence and governance of life in its biological
existence’,15 and on how biopolitics has contributed to bring ‘biological life (zoē) into the modalities
of state power (bios)’.16 While this focus on ‘biological being’,17 ‘biological processes’,18 and on
‘biological, corporeal, or even carnal regimes of power, rule, and force’19 is certainly essential,
12 Michel Foucault, ‘Le sujet et le pouvoir’, Dits et écrits 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), pp. 222–43; see also
Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental rationality: an introduction’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and
Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991), pp. 1–52 (p. 2).
13 Talal Asad, ‘Trying to understand French secularism’, in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds),
Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press),
pp. 494–526 (pp. 521–2), emphasis added.
14 My perspective differs in two main respects from those approaches that draw a sharp distinction ‘between
what counts as governmentality and what is better described as disciplinary power or as biopolitics’( Jonathan
Joseph, ‘The limits of governmentality: Social theory and the international’, European Journal of International
Relations, 16:2 (2010), pp. 223–46 (p. 225)). First, I consider that biopolitics cannot be reduced to disciplinary
power but encompasses a fundamental rationality of care, as I will discuss later in this article. Second, while
acknowledging that governmentality and biopolitics are analytically distinct, I am primarily interested in the
way they sustain and mutually reinforce each other in the dispositif of biopolitical governmentality. This
perspective, to be sure, does not claim to be more authentic or ‘in line’ with Foucault’s thought. Following
Joseph, I consider Foucault’s work as rich as ‘deliberately evasive, elusive and provocative’ to allow for the
possibility of multiple and not necessarily mutually exclusive interpretations, depending on the object being
studied. See Jonathan Joseph, ‘Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach’, Resilience,
1:1 (2013), pp. 38–52 (p. 41).
15 Jef Huysmans, ‘The jargon of exception – on Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political society’, Inter-
national Political Sociology, 2:2 (2008), pp. 165–83 (p. 177).
16 Little and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats’, p. 12.
17 Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (London and New York:
Routledge, 2009), p. 20.
18 Scott Hamilton, ‘The measure of all things? The Anthropocene as a global biopolitics of carbon’, European
Journal of International Relations (2016), doi: 1354066116683831, pp. 1–25 (p. 8).
19 François Debrix, ‘Katechontic sovereignty: Security politics and the overcoming of time’, International





it overlooks how emotional concerns have been an equally important dimension of biopolitical
governmentalities. Hence, the approach advanced in this article maintains that existing responses to
the European refugee crisis should not be explored solely as manifestations of humanitarian
government of refugees,20 ‘biological’ forms of biopolitics,21 thanatopolitics (governing undocu-
mented migrants through violence and death),22 politics of indifference,23 crisis of European
migration policies,24 crisis of liberal values in Europe,25 crisis of solidarity,26 and fear of Islam and
terrorism,27 but also as a product of biopolitical governmental rationalities of biological and
emotional care of host populations enacted through the humanitarian government of refugees.
The article is organised in three sections. First, I consider how the existing literature has largely
neglected the possibility that the humanitarian government of refugees and undocumented/‘irregular’
migrants may also be a way of governing host populations, and has generally deemed that biopolitics
has partial or limited capacity to account for the phenomenon of humanitarian government. Second,
I explore how the humanitarian government of refugees and undocumented/‘irregular’ migrants is a
manifestation of a biopolitical governmentality that aims to maximise the biological and emotional
life of the host population. To this end, I explore two largely neglected dimensions of biopolitics,
namely, its underlying ‘differentialist’ understanding of race, and its concern with the emotional
well-being of the population. Third, I discuss how this conceptual framework can advance our
understanding of the European refugee crisis by analysing two key events: the UK decision to
suspend search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean in 2014, and the different British and
German responses to the plight of Syrian refugees following the death of Alan Kurdi.
I. Humanitarian government as the government of refugees
In this section, I highlight three main arguments of existing accounts of humanitarian government
(which I will challenge in the next two sessions). First, humanitarian government concerns the
government of disenfranchised subjects, such as refugees and undocumented/‘irregular’ migrants,
through the simultaneous deployment of rationalities/practices of care and security; second, huma-
nitarian government cannot be reduced to biopolitical governmentality and Michel Foucault’s notion
of biopower only partially captures this phenomenon; third, humanitarian government entails a
20 Nick Vaughan-Williams, Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015); Martina Tazzioli, ‘Border displacements: Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare
Nostrum and Triton’, Migration Studies, 4:1 (2016), pp. 1–19.
21 Kim Rygiel, ‘Dying to live: Migrant deaths and citizenship politics along European borders: Transgressions,
disruptions, and mobilizations’, Citizenship Studies, 20:5 (2016), pp. 545–60.
22 Vicki Squire, ‘Governing migration through death in Europe and the US: Identiﬁcation, burial and the crisis of
modern humanism’, European Journal of International Relations (16 September 2016), doi: 10.1177/
1354066116668662, pp. 1–20.
23 Tugba Basaran, ‘The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of security’, Security Dia-
logue, 46:3 (2015), pp. 205–20.
24 Manuela Bojadžijev and Sandro Mezzadra, ‘“Refugee crisis” or crisis of European migration policies?’,
FocaalBlog (12 November 2016), available at: {www.focaalblog.com/2015/11/12/manuela-bojadzijev-and-
sandro-mezzadra-refugee-crisis-or-crisis-of-european-migration-policies}.
25 Alexander Betts, ‘The elephant in the room: Islam and the crisis of liberal values in Europe’, Foreign Affairs,
2 (2016), available at: {https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-02-02/elephant-room}.
26 Luca Mavelli and Erin K. Wilson (eds), The Refugee Crisis and Religion: Secularism, Security and Hospitality
in Question (London: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2017).
27 Ibid.; see also Betts, ‘The elephant in the room’.




process of depoliticisation that obliterates the causes of suffering. Didier Fassin, whose research on
humanitarianism has shaped current debates, deﬁnes humanitarian government ‘as the administra-
tion of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle which sees the preservation of life
and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action’.28 This seemingly benign principle
encompasses a powerful depoliticising move. The grammar of emotions, suffering and trauma, while
revealing and making visible the plight of the marginalised and disenfranchised, also establishes a
new ‘language of compassion’ that conceals the causes of inequality, domination, and violence.29
Humanitarian government encourages a focus on the ‘humanitarian present’30 that privileges
responding to the emotional emergency of suffering rather than targeting its root causes.
For this reason, Miriam Ticktin contends, humanitarian government is simultaneously a politics
and an antipolitics.31 In discussing the French ‘illness clause’, a humanitarian principle that
grants residence to those already in the country who suffer from a life-threatening condition
that would not be properly treated in their home country, she emphasises how humanitarian
government politicises migration by establishing what constitutes legitimate suffering, and thus
by turning the ‘suffering body’ into a ‘means to papers’.32 At the same time, humanitarian
government also depoliticises migration by constructing suffering bodies as ‘victim[s] without a
perpetrator’, and individuals as objects of care and compassion rather than equal citizens.33
This makes their condition all the more precarious, as the humanitarian exception that gave them
protection may quickly revert to practices of security (should the ‘sick body’ no longer meet the
criteria of what counts as legitimate suffering) turning the ‘endangered’ into the ‘dangerous’ and the
‘innocent’ into the ‘delinquent’.34
This argument brings to the fore the centrality of the politics of life and the body to humanitarian
government, thus suggesting an important conceptual afﬁnity with the phenomenon famously
described by Foucault as biopolitics. According to Foucault, biopolitics denotes a modern condition
in which the life of individuals (their bodies) and the life of the population as a whole become the
object of political strategies and interventions. At the heart of this condition is a transformation in
the technology of power: from the sovereign power to take life to the biopolitical power to make
live.35 Unlike traditional forms of sovereign power which manifest themselves through mechanisms
of deduction of wealth, labour, services, and ‘ultimately life itself’, biopower – which encompasses
the discipline of the body (‘anatomo-politics’) and the regulation of the population (‘bio-politics’) – is
primarily a power of care aimed at strengthening and enhancing life.36
However, according to Fassin, although biopolitics and humanitarian government share an underlying
politics of care and although humanitarian action employs biopolitical ‘techniques of management of
populations’ – such as ‘setting up refugee camps, establishing protected aid corridors … conducting
28 Didier Fassin, ‘Humanitarianism: a nongovernmental government’, in Michel Feher (ed.), Nongovernmental
Politics (New York: Zone Books), pp. 149–60 (p. 151).
29 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason.
30 Eyal Weizman, The Least of all Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso
Books, 2011).
31 Ticktin, Casualties of Care.
32 Ibid., pp. 2, 4.
33 Ibid., p. 11.
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume I, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 138.





epidemiological studies of infectious diseases’ – they also have different goals.37 Biopolitics is primarily
concerned with caring for and maximising the life of the population as a whole. Humanitarian
government, on the other hand, is a politics of individual life.38 As such, it requires ‘selecting those that
have priority for being saved (for example, when drug supplies are insufﬁcient)’,39 or in the case of the
Mediterranean refugee crisis, deciding which ‘worthy lives’must be saved (even risking other lives to this
end) in the name of the humanitarian imperative, and which ‘unworthy lives’ can be left to drown in the
name of security.40 Hence, humanitarian government rests on the concurrent deployment of logics of
‘securitization and humanitarianism’ that highlight a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between ‘care and control’,
that is, between ‘the humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military (the hand that
strikes)’.41
William Walters’ seminal reﬂections on the humanitarian border (the deployment of humanitarian
government rationalities at borders, or, as he puts it, ‘the reinvention of the border as a space of
humanitarian government’)42 echo Fassin’s remarks. For Walters, humanitarian government
represents a ‘minimalist’ or ‘signiﬁcantly attenuated biopolitics’43 whose task is, as Jill M. Williams
explains, not to ‘optimize and foster life’, but ‘simply hold off death’, with the effect that ‘the life that
is preserved is structurally marginalized and only maintained, not fostered’.44 The encroachment of
humanitarianism and security turns humanitarian government into ‘a site of ambivalence and
undecideability’ characterised by acts of compassion and the deliberate inﬂiction of suffering,
neoliberal disciplining, practices of resistance, forms of counter-conduct, and the constant, mutual
cooptation of humanitarianism by security and vice versa.45 This complex ﬁeld of interactions
transcends mere processes of ‘biopolitical reproduction’, Walters contends, and calls for supple-
menting ‘Foucault’s toolbox’ with new concepts.46
Taking up this challenge, Adrian Little and Nick Vaughan-Williams argue that, in order to grasp the
ambivalence at the heart of humanitarian government, it is necessary to consider Roberto Esposito’s
concept of (auto)immunity. This is the idea that the protection of life requires the incorporation
(in small doses) of that which represents a threat to life in order to develop immunity against it.47
For them, Foucauldian biopolitics primarily concerns the ‘positive’ goals of optimisation and
maximisation of life, whereas humanitarian government as deployed in practices of ‘compassionate
borderwork’ is neither a ‘straightforwardly “positive”’ nor simply a ‘“negative” or thanatopolitical’
‘biopolitical technology of power’.48 Accordingly, biopolitics is unable to account for the capacity of
humanitarian government ‘to lead to “irregular” migrants’ and refugees’ dehumanisation and
37 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, p. 226.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Basaran, ‘The saved and the drowned’.
41 Polly Pallister-Wilkins, ‘The humanitarian politics of European border policing: Frontex and border police
in Evros’, International Political Sociology, 9:1 (2015), pp. 53–69 (p. 59), discussing the argument of
Michel Agier,Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2011).
42 Walters, ‘Foucault and frontiers’, p. 138.
43 Ibid., p. 150.
44 Williams, ‘From humanitarian exceptionalism to contingent care’, p. 17.
45 Walters, ‘Foucault and frontiers’, p. 144.
46 Ibid., pp. 144, 158.
47 Little and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats’.
48 Ibid., p. 18.




death’.49 Conversely, Esposito’s concept of (auto)immunity explains how protection of life through
the inoculation of threatening agents in excessive doses may result in ‘an autoimmune crisis’.50 From
this perspective, humanitarian government is informed by ‘an (auto)immunitary logic: the very lives
that are identiﬁed as in need of protecting and saving can also become targeted by lethal apparatuses
of security’.51 This ambiguity is particularly evident in the Australian ‘stop the boats’ policy that
claims, at once, to protect the migrants by abandoning them.52
The partial or limited capacity of biopolitics to account for the phenomenon of humanitarian
government can also be observed, more understatedly, in Ticktin’s account, when she discusses
how humanitarianism produces a process of ‘biological involution’.53 This is the production
of disabled subjects who are ultimately more valued and mobile than their ‘able bodied’ counterparts
because they can be made the object of a politics of compassion. In this regard, Ticktin recounts
the story of several HIV+ patients who stopped taking their medication once they received their
residence papers, fearful that an improvement in their condition could undermine their right to
reside in the country.54 Interestingly, although Ticktin argues that the ‘apolitical suffering body’
of humanitarianism lies ‘at the intersection of biopolitical modernity and global capital’,55 she
hardly analyses the relationship between humanitarianism and biopolitics, let alone explores how
the process of ‘biological involution’ may be reconciled with biopolitics. From the perspective of
Little and Vaughan-Williams’ argument, Ticktin’s neglect of biopolitics may be considered an
indication of the ‘diagnostic limits’56 of biopolitics vis-à-vis the phenomenon of humanitarian
government.
For Little and Vaughan-Williams, these limits concern not just the incapacity of biopolitics to fully
explain the simultaneous deployment of rationalities of care and security, but also its inability
to account for what they regard as the ‘third dimension’ of humanitarian government, namely a
process of displacement of responsibility for migrant deaths (such as those in the Mediterranean
or on Australian coasts) ‘from both migrants and refugees and restrictive border security and
migration management’ to human trafﬁckers and smugglers.57 This argument further reinforces
Fassin’s and Ticktin’s views that humanitarian government depoliticises the suffering of vulnerable
subjects by suggesting that depoliticisation takes place through a process of displacement of
responsibility to criminal networks. Yet, as Jill Williams – drawing on Roxanne Lynn Doty58 –
suggests, not just individuals and groups, but also natural environments, such as the harsh landscape
that surrounds the US-Mexico border, can become the target of strategies of displacement
of responsibility. Doty talks of ‘spaces of moral alibi’ where ‘the state abdicates responsibility for
migrant deaths by pointing to the harsh terrain (and individual migrant decisions) as the cause of
deaths’.59
49 Ibid., p. 4.
50 Ibid., p. 19.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ticktin, Casualties of Care, p. 215.
54 Ibid., p. 13.
55 Ibid., p. 98
56 Little and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Stopping boats’, p. 4.
57 Ibid., p. 2.
58 Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Bare life: Border-crossing deaths and spaces of moral alibi’, Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space, 29:4 (2011), pp. 599–612.





This brief overview suggests that: (1) humanitarian government concerns the government of
disenfranchised subjects, such as refugees and undocumented/‘irregular’ migrants through the
simultaneous deployment of rationalities/practices of care and security; (2) these rationalities/
practices are only partially captured by a biopolitical lens; and (3) the deployment of humanitarian
government entails a process of depoliticisation and displacement of the causes of suffering. In the
remainder of this article I want to challenge the ﬁrst two arguments (Section II) and explore in
greater depth the third one (Section III). The ﬁrst two arguments, I will argue, while very insightful,
suffer from a fundamental ‘diagnostic limit’ (to borrow Little and Vaughan-Williams' expression)
they consider that the referent object of humanitarian government is disenfranchised ‘others’. My
contention is that humanitarian government is also a biopolitical governmentality targeting host
populations, whose aim is to maximise their biological and emotional well-being through the
selective inclusion/exclusion of refugees. In order to advance this argument, in the next section
I will explore how this process of inclusion/exclusion rests on a ‘differentialist’ understanding of
racism and how biopower targets not just biological, but emotional life. These arguments
will be instrumental to explore, in the third section, how caring for the emotional well-being of
populations requires not just depoliticising the suffering of migrants, but blaming them for their own
suffering.
II. Humanitarian government as the biopolitical government of host
populations
The perspectives discussed in the previous section tend to reduce biopolitics to a politics of care and
maximisation of life, and overlook how the biopolitical ‘power to make live’ is not an unqualiﬁed
attempt to promote all forms of life, but only the life of the race/population cared for. For Foucault,
the key dimensions of biopolitics (‘love and care’)60 encompass and indeed are advanced through the
‘negative’ biopolitical power to ‘let die’ and the traditional sovereign ‘right to take life’.61 As Fou-
cault explains, with the emergence of biopolitical governmentality ‘the problem of sovereignty is not
eliminated; on the contrary it is made more acute than ever’.62 The reason is that the power ‘to kill’,
‘take life’, or ‘let die’ is essential to make life live by marginalising, segregating, or eliminating those
internal deviant elements and external threatening ‘others’ which may put at risk the survival,
ﬂourishing, and well-being of the population. Particularly with respect to the latter, biopolitical
governmentality requires the active deployment of what Foucault describes as state or biopolitical
racism in order to discriminate between ‘threatening’ and ‘non-threatening’ others.
For Foucault, biopolitical racism ‘is an expression of a schism within society that is provoked by the
idea of an ongoing and always incomplete cleansing of the social body’,63 which acts as a govern-
mental rationality insofar as it breaks the biological continuum of life by dividing it into ‘superior/
good’ and ‘inferior/bad races’, and establishes a relationship whereby the ‘the death of the bad race,
60 Mika Ojakangas, ‘Impossible dialogue on bio-power: Agamben and Foucault’, Foucault Studies, 2:4 (2005),
pp. 5–28 (p. 20).
61 Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76 (New York:
Picador, 2003), p. 241.
62 Michel Foucault, Security Territory Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78 (New York:
Palgrave, 2009), p. 105.
63 Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2011),
pp. 43–4.




of the inferior race … is something that will make life in general healthier’.64 It follows that modern
biopolitical racism is not exclusively and primarily ‘an irrational prejudice, a form of socio-political
discrimination, or an ideological motive in a political doctrine; rather, it is a form of government that
is designed to manage a population’65 by raising the problem of ‘foreigners’ and ‘deviants’.
Following Foucault, racism can be understood as a way to measure, assess, rank, intervene on, and
distribute individuals in the domain of the living according to their endowment or absence of those
biological qualities that can contribute to the well-being and ﬂourishing of the population. Modern
biopolitical racism is an essential component of biopower. It is ‘a way of introducing a break into the
domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’.66
According to Foucault, biopolitical racism, while shaped by traditional forms of racism based on
nationality, ethnicity, religion, colour, and gender, also partially transcends them. As Roxanne Doty
has perceptively observed, Foucault’s approach to racism rests on a ‘differentialist’ perspective.67 The
latter deems ‘race’ a mobile category and a product of the underlying governmental rationality –
racism – that constructs the category of race and endows it with meaning according to shifting and
evolving (bio)political circumstances.68 It follows that, from the perspective of biopolitical racism,
the boundary that separates ‘superior’ and ‘inferior races’ is a tool of the biopolitical governmentality
targeting the population rather than what delimitates its space of action. This means that the
boundary between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior races’ – that is, the boundary between the population
under power’s control and external ‘others’ – can be redrawn beyond traditional forms of racism
(based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, colour, and gender) if members of the ‘inferior races’ are
deemed instrumental to enhance the material and emotional life of the population. This suggests that
practices of humanitarian government resulting in the acceptance of refugees may not have as their
exclusive (or even primary) goal the care of ‘disenfranchised subjects’, but the care and well-being of
host populations. Humanitarian government, in other words, may be a biopolitical governmentality
targeting host populations aimed at enhancing their emotional and material well-being.
In order to better understand this argument, it is necessary to consider how European anxieties about
refugees have been exacerbated by the predominantly Muslim identity of those seeking refuge.
The widespread European perception of Islam as a backward, irrational, violent-prone religion that
promotes terrorism and gender inequality, unable to distinguish between facts and beliefs, and
unwilling to accept the separation between religion and politics69 has fuelled traditional manifes-
tations of racism mostly in the form of anti-Muslimism or Islamophobia.70 These manifestations
have ranged from several European countries (including Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Cyprus) refusing to take in Muslim refugees or expressing strong preferences towards Christian
refugees in order to preserve their Christian identity,71 to media representations of Muslim refugees
as ‘patriarchal, homophobic, violent threats to personal, national and international security’ as well
64 Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’, p. 254.
65 Kim Su Rasmussen, ‘Foucault’s genealogy of racism’, Theory, Culture & Society, 28:5 (2011), pp. 34–51
(p. 34).
66 Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’, p. 254.
67 Doty, ‘Bare life’, p. 603.
68 Ibid.
69 Luca Mavelli, Europe’s Encounter with Islam: The Secular and the Postsecular (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
70 Fred Halliday, ‘“Islamophobia” reconsidered’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22:5 (1999), pp. 892–902. See also
Betts, ‘The elephant in the room’.
71 Erin K. Wilson and Luca Mavelli, ‘The refugee crisis and religion: Beyond conceptual and physical boundaries’,





as ‘“rapefugees” and innate sexual predators [as in the infamous Charlie Hebdo cartoon depicting a
grown-up Alan Kurdi molesting women] following the attacks on European women in Cologne
on New Years’ Eve’.72 However, despite these traditional manifestations of racism grounded in a
deep-seated mistrust and suspicion of Islam, a number of Muslim refugees have been portrayed as
‘good refugees’ who should be welcomed.
As Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh explains, Syrian refugees as a whole have been initially framed as ‘good
refugees’, that is, as ‘both legitimate and priority “candidates” for international protection’ to the
effect that they have been ‘fast- tracked’ and given precedence over Iraqis and Afghans, who have
been treated as ‘second-tier refugees’.73 However, with the intensiﬁcation of the crisis, the binary
clichéd representation of ‘good/deserving/real refugees’ versus ‘bad/undeserving/bogus refugees’ has
also begun to apply to Syrian asylum seekers. In particular, the ﬁgure of the ‘good/deserving/real
refugee’ has been employed to describe ‘women, children and male victims of violence who patiently
wait in refugee camps to be rescued by British/European/Western saviours’.74 Conversely, bad
refugees are those who exercise agency by taking matters in their own hands and initiate the
dangerous journey across sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean to seek refuge in Europe. They
‘challenge the script “refugee = victim” thus becoming a “swarm of people coming across the
Mediterranean”’75 (as UK Prime Minister David Cameron infamously stated), ‘“queue jumpers”
and “bogus asylum seekers”’ who are jeopardising the protection claims made by ‘real’ (that is,
‘good’) refugees,76 economic migrants and potential terrorists who put at risk the survival of the
nation. The ‘good refugee’, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh remarks, is epitomised by the hybrid ﬁgure of the
weakened and dependent ‘womanandchild’, as per Cynthia Enloe’s deﬁnition.77 This ﬁgure of
defenceless, apolitical and innocent victimhood, highly valued in ‘the global meritocracy of suffer-
ing’,78 has more recently also been extended to vulnerable male ﬁgures, such as Laith Majid, a Syrian
refugee who was pictured ‘weeping in relief as he reaches the island of Kos holding his 7-year-old
daughter in his arms and hugging his 9-year-old son’ and was subsequently dubbed by the BBC as
one of the ‘faces of the migration crisis’.79
Undoubtedly, the ‘good refugee’ discourse draws on a series of racial and gender stereotypes: the
defenceless Muslim woman (doubly victim of Islamic patriarchy and war), the innocent child (not yet
corrupted by the ideology of Islam), and the desexualised and even feminised, and for this very
reason, non-threatening Muslim man (the negation of the hypersexualised, violent, and fanatic
Muslim). Similarly, the ﬁgure of the ‘good refugee’ rests on a paternalistic racism that reinforces
notions of racial superiority, magnanimity, and moral righteousness. This paternalistic racism
crystallises the inequality and power imbalance between ‘white’ and ‘brown’ lives and, as Mahmood
Mamdani observes, constructs Muslims as ‘petriﬁed into a lifeless custom … incapable of trans-
forming their culture’ with the effect that their ‘salvation lies, as always, in philanthropy, in being
72 Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘The faith-gender-asylum nexus: an intersectionalist analysis of representations of the
“refugee crisis”’, in in Mavelli and Wilson (eds), The Refugee Crisis and Religion.
73 Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Repressentations of displacement from the Middle East and North Africa’, Public
Culture, 28:3 (2016), pp. 457–73 (p. 459).
74 Wilson and Mavelli, ‘The refugee crisis and religion’, p. 7.
75 Ibid.
76 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘The faith-gender-asylum nexus’, p. 210.
77 Ibid., p. 211.
78 Clifford Bob, cited in Miriam Ticktin, ‘Where ethics and politics meet: the violence of humanitarianism
in France’, American Ethnologist, 33:1 (2006), pp. 33–49 (p. 34).
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saved from the outside’.80 However, I want to argue, the identiﬁcation of certain Muslim groups as
‘good refugees’ who deserve protection and inclusion also signals a very partial suspension and
re-elaboration of racist prejudices about Islam. What makes this possible?
Humanitarian government scholars would argue that it is the representation and construction of certain
Muslims as ‘womenandchildren’ or ‘menandchildren’ in need that prompts the humanitarian response
and an equally important exacerbation of racial prejudices and securitisation towards those Muslims –
male, single, healthy, and young who have already crossed or attempt to cross the Mediterranean – who
escape the status of victims to be rescued and are perceived as economic migrants, sexual predators, and
potential terrorists. While agreeing with this argument, the biopolitical perspective advanced in this
article emphasises that the deﬂation of racism towards ‘womenandchildren’ and ‘menandchildren’
Muslim refugees and its exasperation towards other Muslim refugees represents an instantion of bio-
political racism that redraws the line between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior races’. As it was suggested,
biopolitical racism may re-elaborate traditional forms of racism if some members of the ‘inferior races’
are deemed instrumental to enhance the life of the host population. Accordingly, the humanitarian
government of a few Syrian refugees victims of violence and abuse and/or whose suffering has been
caught on camera and ‘gone viral’ may be primarily a biopolitical governmentality that has the host
population as its object. This biopolitical outlook, however, raises a series of questions: What makes
these ‘sick’ and ‘feminised’ refugees ‘valuable’ from a biopolitical perspective? How can they maximise
the life of the populations hosting them?
Numerous scholars have argued that, from the perspective of biopolitical governmentality, ‘valuable
lives’ may be considered those that can be inscribed into neoliberal logics of entrepreneurship and
resilience, responsibility and self-governance, security and risk, competition and inequality, con-
sumption and accumulation, circulation and dispossession.81 This view ﬁnds resonance in Foucault’s
understanding of biopower as an ‘indispensable element’ in the development of neoliberal capitalism,
which would not have been possible ‘without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of
production’, ‘the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes’, and the
development of ‘methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general’.82
This argument rests on a widespread ‘biological’ understanding of biopolitics, what Vivienne Jabri
has perceptively described as ‘the biologization of power’,83 namely, the fact that, with biopolitics,
‘the basic biological features of the human species’ become ‘the object of political strategisation’.84
Life understood in its material, biological, and molecular dimensions becomes the object of a
80 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Good Muslim, bad Muslim: a political perspective on culture and terrorism’. American
Anthropologist, 104:3 (2002), pp. 766–75 (p. 767).
81 See, among others, Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, ‘Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an
introduction’, Review of International Studies, 34:2 (2008), pp. 265–92; Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-
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Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War; Majia Holmer Nadesan, Governmentality, Biopower, and
Everyday Life (London: Routledge, 2010); Melinda Cooper, Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in
the Neoliberal Era (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2011); Tom Lundborg and Nick Vaughan-
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complex assemblage of biopolitical interventions aimed at its regulation, evaluation, hierarchisation,
entrepreneurialisation, commodiﬁcation, securitisation and, overall, neoliberal subjectiﬁcation for
the purpose of enhancing its strength, value, productive, and reproductive capacity. From this
perspective, ‘valuable lives’ in biopolitical terms are those that can be transformed ‘into value, in the
form of commodity and capital’,85 and can adapt and contribute to the reproduction of the neo-
liberal biopolitical order, thus generating surplus life that may strengthen the life of the population.86
From this perspective, sick ‘womenandchildren’ refugees – such as those that the UK has pledged to
take in directly from camps in Syria’s neighbouring countries – can hardly be considered ‘valuable’
in biopolitical terms. The decision to care for a small number of ‘sick bodies’ that would be a burden
for the welfare state, could not generate biological surplus-life, could not be integrated into neo-
liberal mechanisms of economic control, and would not contribute to strengthening and maximising
the biological life of the British population, would indeed appear to be a case of humanitarian
government. It entails: focusing on a small number of individual lives rather than a population as a
whole, as Fassin would suggest; providing a ‘temporary and ad hoc intervention’, as Walters would
remark;87 concentrating on the ‘politics of compassion’ of the ‘humanitarian present’ at the expense
of long term solutions, as Weizman would argue; welcoming refugees as objects of care and
compassion rather than equal citizens, as Ticktin would observe; and hardening the borders for those
‘able-bodied migrants’ who would attempt to ﬁnd refuge in Europe, thus deploying humanitarianism
as part of an autoimmune securitising logic, as Little and Vaughan-Williams would emphasise.
However, if a strictly biological reading of biopolitics is abandoned, it is possible to consider how
sick ‘womenandchildren’ refugees may be ‘valuable’ from a biopolitical perspective, that is, capable
of enhancing and maximising the life of the populations hosting them. Ted Rutland, for instance, has
argued that an exclusive biological outlook displays ‘an unduly narrow conception of biopolitics’.88
It neglects how biopolitics transcends ‘the most basic biological or medical dimensions of existence’
such as ‘the health of the population; its longevity, growth, and decline; and its physical security’ and
encompasses a speciﬁc concern with the affective and emotional life of the population,89 which is not
merely derivative of biological interventions.90 Biopolitics, in other words, would not just focus on
the material dispositions of the population in order to promote and advance its biological well-being,
neither could it be reduced to the cultivation of feelings of uncertainty, fear, anxiety, and insecurity
in order to fashion resilient subjects capable of withstanding and adapting to the shocks of the
neoliberal economic order,91 and in order to justify its power to kill or let die those members of the
subspecies that represent a threat. Crucially, biopolitics would also entail caring for and, therefore,
intervening on, the emotional life of the population. In order to appreciate this argument it is
necessary to further excavate Foucault’s biopolitical account beyond its manifest concern with the
85 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, ‘The biopolitical imaginary of species-being’, p. 2.
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biological and consider the role that pastoral power and the police have in the genealogy of bio-
politics. The relevance of these two technologies of government in relation to the biopolitical pre-
occupation for the emotional well-being of the population has often been paid limited attention to or
been neglected in international relations scholarship on biopolitics.92
For Foucault, pastoral power and the police represent crucial dimensions in the genealogy of modern
biopolitics.93 While a full exploration of this genealogy would be beyond the scope of this article, for
the purpose of my argument it is important to consider that pastoral power, with the metaphor of
God as a shepherd, involved a fundamental focus on the ‘care of souls’.94 It was exercised by the
shepherd over a ﬂock, and endowed the shepherd with the task ‘to provide continuous material and
spiritual welfare for each and every member of the ﬂock’.95 Pastoral power was thus ‘a beneﬁcent
power’, a ‘power of care’,96 concerned with ‘constantly ensur[ing], sustain[ing], and improve[ing] the
lives of each and every one’,97 and with providing ‘spiritual direction’.98 Its ultimate task was the
spiritual ‘salvation of the ﬂock’ and of every single sheep in the ﬂock, with the effect that pastoral
power was both an individualising and massifying power.99 According to Foucault, the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries saw a fundamental transformation in the logics and reach of the pastorate
that ceased to be an exclusively religious phenomenon. It migrated to the political sphere and
crucially shaped the ﬁrst governmental rationality of the modern state, namely raison d'État (reason
of state). The latter had as its goal the strengthening of the state through a technology of power
focused on the unlimited regulation of its subjects, from their economic activity to their social
behaviours through the ‘unlimited objectives’ of the ‘police’.100
With this term, Foucault does not understand ‘exclusively the institution of police in the modern
sense’, but also, and possibly more importantly, a regulatory type of power concerned with ‘the art
of managing life and the well-being of populations’.101 Police thus stands for policy or ‘science of
policy’ and has as its main goals attending to the basic necessity of life of the population, providing
its members with an education and an occupation, making possible their orderly circulation, and
ensuring the growth of their wealth and the preservation of their health. All these goals are, of
course, instrumental for augmenting and enhancing the state’s strength. However, Foucault con-
tinues, in order to achieve this task, the police cannot just attend to the biological well-being of the
population, but must also focus on ‘individual felicity’, on the ‘well-being [of the population] beyond
[mere biological] being’, by ‘procuring the happiness of its subjects’.102 As Mika Ojakangas explains,
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even though the new rationality of government that underscores the biopolitical project relinquishes
the goal of total control of raison d'État by introducing the principle of self-limitation of govern-
mental reason, the concern with happiness and care for the emotional well-being of the population
retains a central presence in the biopolitical episteme (with the effect that the ‘ideology of the police’
should be considered a crucial precursor of modern biopolitics).103
Recent research in human geography and cultural studies has emphasised how ‘the affective life of
individuals and collectives is an “object-target of” and “condition for” contemporary forms of
biopower’.104 Two main dynamics can be identiﬁed. First, ‘capital extracts value from affect –
around consumer conﬁdence, political fears, etc., such that the difference between commodiﬁcation
and labor, production and reproduction, are collapsed in the modulation of the capacity to circulate
affect’.105 Second, capital does not just extract value from affect. As part of the neoliberal process of
economisation of society,106 affect becomes itself a form of capital that is instrumental for governing
the population. Promoting enjoyment, positive feelings, fulﬁlling emotions, and rewarding passions –
in other words – caring for the emotional well-being of the population through the accumulation of
constructive sentiments becomes a central biopolitical rationality of government.
This perspective raises a crucial question on the British policy towards Syrian refugees. Could it be
understood as a case not just of humanitarian government of refugees, but also of biopolitical
government of the British population through the humanitarian government of Syrian refugees?
Could the Syrian sick children, women who had been raped and men who had suffered torture to
whom the government promised sanctuary be considered biopolitically ‘valuable lives’ because
instrumental to enticing positive feelings of compassion and moral righteousness in the British
population? Could this be a case in which the ‘differentialist’ rationality of biopolitical racism
redraws the line between who must live and who must die because the inclusion of Syrian ‘sick’ and
‘womenandchildren’ bodies in the population contributes to enhance and maximise the latter’s
emotional well-being? In the next section, I will explore this argument by analysing the UK decision
to suspend search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean in 2014, and by comparing the British
and German different responses to the plight of Syrian refugees following the death of Alan Kurdi.
My argument will be that these responses have been informed by both emotional and biological
biopolitical rationalities of care of the British and German populations.
III. Blame and emotional-biological care in the British and German responses to
the refugee crisis
An important argument that emerged in the ﬁrst section of this article is that humanitarian
government entails a process of depoliticisation of suffering. The emotional language that frames
this phenomenon obscures the causes of domination, injustice, and violence by replacing them with a
grammar of solidarity and compassion. To reprise a previous quote by Ticktin, humanitarian
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government constructs suffering bodies as ‘victim[s] without a perpetrator’, and when it occasionally
acknowledges the presence of a perpetrator, it eschews political responsibility by blaming ‘third
parties’, such as criminal networks (as discussed by Little and Vaughan-Williams), or natural
environments (as discussed by Williams and by Doty). However, from the perspective I advanced in
the previous section – the humanitarian government of refugees as a biopolitical governmentality of
the population aimed at enhancing its biological and emotional well-being – depoliticisation may not
be a tenable rationality of government in the long run. How is it possible to care for the emotional
well-being of the population when humanitarian practices towards a minority entail the securitisa-
tion of the majority of refugees, with the effect of letting many of them die, as in the 2014 British
decision to stop search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean? If the death of undocumented
migrants can be justiﬁed through biopolitical racism as a biological necessity in order to preserve the
culture, wealth, and health of the population, how can the killing or letting die of refugees not result
in feelings of guilt, sadness, remorse that run counter to the biopolitical goal of enhancing the
emotional welfare of the population? My argument is that humanitarian government entails not just
the depoliticisation of suffering – the construction of ‘victims without a perpetrator’ – but the
identiﬁcation of a perpetrator in the migrants themselves. It entails blaming refugees for their own
suffering.107 The UK decision to suspend search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean
provides a remarkable illustration of this case.
In October 2014, the UK Government announced that it would no longer support search-and-rescue
operations in the Mediterranean on the grounds that such operations are ‘an unintended “pull
factor”, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to
more tragic and unnecessary deaths’ (then UK Foreign Ofﬁce Minister Lady Anelay).108 While this
argument concealed the political causes of suffering – ‘push factors’ such as extreme poverty,
persecution, war, famines, genocide, and European political responsibilities – it did not simply
promote a process of depoliticisation, but one of blaming undocumented migrants for their own
suffering. Undocumented migrants were portrayed – in a rather paternalistic and racist fashion – as
fundamentally irresponsible, since they would choose to embark on a journey that has resulted in
over 20,000 deaths over the last twenty years and 3,000 deaths between January and September
2015 (and over 5,000 deaths in 2016).109 Hence, this biopolitics of blame enabled the UK to portray
itself as a responsible ‘fatherly’ actor – whose responsibility would consist in letting the irresponsible
migrants drown to prevent ‘unnecessary deaths’. This argument has acquired a prominent place in
current public debates on migration. Looking at readers’ comments to online articles documenting
recent tragedies in the Mediterranean, one easily encounters the following: ‘These People leave their
countries at their own risk and peril and if they are so crazy to brave danger they should face the
Music [sic] and if they at last ﬁnd death, it is only their fault if they come to a bad end’; ‘If you feel
that it’s your fault I and others certainly do not feel that it is ours. These irresponsible ILLEGAL
immigrants know what dangers they will face so let them face the consequences’; ‘Honestly these
107 Williams (drawing on Doty) and more recently Squire brieﬂy consider this argument as part of a strategy of
deﬂection of ofﬁcial responsibilities. However, neither of these perspectives discusses the blaming of migrants
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people ﬂee their own mess, their wars were to get rid of their dictatorship … sorry but it is NOT our
fault.’110
Blaming irregular migrants for their tragic destiny should be considered a form of biopolitical care
for the emotional well-being of the British population: a way of exempting it from responsibility for
the recurrent tragedies in the Mediterranean. This biopolitics of care has been supported by the
deployment of biopolitical racism that has contributed to construct refugees as the embodiment
of an ‘inferior race’ that threatens the British population. The nature of biopolitical racism in the
British context needs to be understood with reference to the sociopolitical anxiety about Islam
discussed in the previous section, and to long-standing fears about Britain being ‘swamped by
people with a different culture’, as Margaret Thatcher infamously declared in 1978, stating that it
was necessary to ‘allay people’s fear on numbers’.111 These concerns have shaped a refugee policy
that, across different Conservative and Labour prime ministers, has shown a central preoccupation
with ‘bogus’ and ‘undeserving’ asylum seekers threatening the identity, culture, wealth, and health
of the British population and undermining the protection that should be offered to ‘genuine
refugees’.112 It is revealing that a 2003 poll for The Times indicated the number of asylum seekers
as ‘the most serious problem in Britain at present’, whereas a study published a year later by
the Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR) highlighted how some of the key terms
and expressions used by the popular press to describe asylum seekers and refugees included
‘scrounger, sponger, fraudster, robbing the system’, ‘burden/strain on resources’, ‘illegal working,
cheap labour’, ‘criminal, violent’, ‘mob, horde, riot, rampage, disorder’, and ‘a threat, a worry, to be
feared’.113
Back to the current crisis, the construction of refugees as potentially ‘bogus’, expression of an
‘inferior race’ (in Foucauldian biopolitical terms) and ultimately responsible for their destiny was not
substantially undermined by the 19 April 2015 shipwreck, when a migrants’ boat capsized off
the coast of Libya, killing an estimated 700 people in what Maltese Prime Minister Joseph
Muscat described as the ‘biggest human tragedy of the last few years’.114 Following mounting public
pressure, the UK government backtracked from its opposition to search-and-rescue operations.
It admitted that the idea that they would be a ‘pull’ factor was based on ‘anecdotal’ evidence and
that halting these operations had failed. While this prompted the British government to send a
Royal Navy ship to the Mediterranean to resume search-and-rescue operations, thus implicitly
acknowledging that there were legitimate ‘push’ factors behind the migrants’ decision to cross
the Mediterranean, it continued to uphold that the ultimate responsibility for the migrants’
destiny lay with the migrants themselves. Accordingly, the public representation of refugees as an
‘inferior race’ that threatened the British way of life continued unabated. In July 2015, David
Cameron spoke of ‘a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life,
wanting to come to Britain because Britain has got jobs, it’s got a growing economy, it’s an incredible
110 See, for example {http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2014/10/30/migrants-mediterranean/#.VP10m0uQeSI}
accessed 14 February 2016.
111 Cited in Evan Smith, ‘“Managing migration”: Discourses on immigration and “race relations” from
Thatcherism to New Labour’, in Lori Maguire (ed.), Domestic Policy Discourse in the US and the UK in the
New World Order (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2010), pp. 256–62 (p. 253).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., p. 261.
114 Cited in ‘Hundreds “locked in hold” of boat capsized off Libya’, Al Jazeera (20 April 2015), available at:
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place to live’.115 A month later, he reinforced the classic refrain of economic migrants disguised as
refugees coming to the UK to steal jobs and depress wages by portraying them as burglars trying to
‘break into Britain without permission’.116
A more forceful challenge to the British refugee policy eventually came a few months later, in
September 2015, with the death of three-year-old Alan Kurdi on the coast of the Turkish holiday resort
of Bodrum. The picture of his dead body washed ashore prompted a strong sense of identiﬁcation, with
thousands of emotional comments inundating the media, such as: ‘My god, that could be my child,
who has the same colour hair, the same chubby legs.’117 The reason for this was that Alan represented
the ‘ideal refugee’: a child, an innocent apolitical victim who would have deserved to be helped.
Cameron was quick to embrace the emotional wave – ‘Anyone who saw those pictures overnight could
not help but be moved and, as a father, I felt deeply moved by the sight of that young boy on a beach in
Turkey’, he declared118 – and, following mounting public pressure for more open and welcoming
immigration policies, vowed that the UK would ‘fulﬁl’ its ‘moral responsibilities’ towards Syrian
refugees by taking 20,000 of them directly from camps neighbouring Syria over a period of ﬁve years.
From a humanitarian government perspective, the decision to take only sick children, women who had
been raped, and men who had suffered torture would be considered an instantiation of the simulta-
neous deployment of logics of care for a small group of ‘sick bodies’ that would be welcomed as objects
of compassion, rather than equal citizens, and logics of security for the majority of refugees, for whom
the borders would be further hardened; it would be considered a case of temporary and ad hoc
intervention which privileges an immediate compassionate response that focuses on few individual lives
and fails to address the underlying root causes of the problem, and which ultimately underscores
autoimmune tendencies that negate the very lives that are claimed to be saved.
Yet, from the complementary perspective that I have articulated in this article, it can be argued that this
initiative was not just – and not primarily – aimed at governing Syrian refugees, but the emotional well-
being of the British population. The ﬂurry of calls urging the government to act, in fact, also raised a
series of questions about British identity, the crisis of British value, and the extent to which Britain was
failing the test of compassion. Harshly criticising ‘the UK’s dismal record on refugees’, well below that
of comparable nations in the European Union, the Financial Timeswrote that ‘there is a compassionate
and humane streak in the British people that ought not to be underestimated. As Europe’s refugee crisis
develops, it is not the defensive crouch of Mr Cameron that Britons may come to admire but the
courage and principle of Ms Merkel’.119 ‘British people are compassionate people who will want to
play their part’ wrote two Labour MPs (Stephen Timms and Lyn Brown),120 echoed by several Tory
115 Cited in ‘David Cameron: “Swarm” of migrants crossing Mediterranean’, BBC News (30 July 2015),
available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33714282} accessed 31 March 2016.
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MPs who tweeted: ‘We r nothing without compassion. Pic should make us all ashamed. We have failed
in Syria. I am sorry little angel, RIP’ (Nadhim Zahawi); ‘The UK I know has always shouldered its
burden in the world. DfID is doing life-saving work abroad but we can – & must – do more at home’
(Ruth Davidson); ‘We cannot be the generation that fails this test of humanity. We must do all we can’
(Nicola Blackwood).121 Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron labelled the government policy on
refugee as ‘morally wrong’, while Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon urged to ‘do more’.122 On
traditional and social media the idea that ‘British values demand that we aid Syria refugees’123 gained a
remarkable momentum.
Undoubtedly, Cameron’s pledge to take in 20,000 Syrian refugees was a way of quelling public and
political pressures, including from his own party. The focus on ‘womenandchildren’ refugees taken
directly from Syrian camps drew on racial and gender stereotypes and displayed a paternalist racism that
reproduced the refugees as helpless victims who should be rewarded for patiently waiting in camp, thus
further condemning those who would decide to exercise agency by seeking refuge in Europe. Yet,
Cameron’s pledge was also instrumental to re-establish the social imaginary of Britain ‘as a moral nation
… fulﬁl[ling]… [its] moral responsibilities’,124 hence instrumental to govern the emotional welfare of the
British population, whose consciousness was no longer paciﬁed by the ‘bogus’ refugee narrative and the
idea that all undocumented migrants were victims of their own actions. Biopolitical rationalities and
racism partially redrew the line between who must live and who should die by constructing Syrian sick
children, women who had been raped, and men who had suffered torture as ‘valuable’ refugees who
could enhance and maximise the emotional life of the country by restoring a self-understanding of Britain
as compassionate, moral, and caring. Cameron’s humanitarian government of a tiny fraction of Syrian
refugees was thus of a way of governing the emotional well-being of the British population and
enhancing its sense of self-appreciation and self-worthiness. Yet, as I shall discuss in the remainder of this
section, this limited act of humanitarianism also responded to biological governmental rationalities of
care. In order to explore this argument, it is useful to compare the British response to Alan’s death to the
German one.
Shortly after Alan’s tragic drowning, Germany decided to immediately allow in tens of thousands of
Syrian refugees and vowed to welcome up to 800,000 refugees a year. Numerous explanations have been
advanced for this landmark historical decision, including: Germans’ own experience as refugees in the
aftermath of the Second World War, when 12 million German citizens and people of German ancestry
were expelled from Eastern European countries; historical guilt for the devastations of Nazism and the
Holocaust; a reaction against mounting xenophobia; Germany’s ‘controversial role in the Greek debt
crisis’, and the desire of Chancellor Angela Merkel to display a humanity that had been perceived as
missing in the German imposition of draconian austerity measures on Southern Europe and particularly
Greece; Germany’s commitment to save Europe by preventing a humanitarian catastrophe that would
most likely destabilise the countries along the Balkan refugee route; Merkel’s own experience of growing
up in East Germany as captured by her rebuttal to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s hope that
more fences be built across Europe: ‘I lived behind a fence for too long for me to now wish for those
times to return’; andMerkel’s own vision of Christian justice, the result of her upbringing as the daughter
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of a socialist pastor, which requires caring for those in need of help and the strangers ‘standing in the rain
before your door’, and summarised by her statement: ‘We hold speeches on Sundays and we talk about
values. I am the chair of a Christian political party. And then people come to us from 2,000 kilometers
away and … you can’t show a friendly face here anymore?’.125
German openness to Syrian refugees should also be understood as part of a particularly welcoming
refugee policy that, until 1992, was embedded in the constitution.126 The subsequent restriction of this
‘previously unqualiﬁed right’,127 did not prevent Germany from hosting ‘more than 2 million refugees
from conﬂicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia’.128 The ‘compassionate
pragmatism’ of German ‘Willkommenskultur’ (culture of welcome), also motivated by the desire to
oppose the still glimmering embers of racism and xenophobia,129 has contributed to establish a self-
understanding of Germany as a moral leader, capable of expressing solidarity towards distant strangers
in need and, in the words of German President Joachim Gauck, committed to ‘do more … better … in
respect of… the rights we have and are committed to… [and] together [with other European countries],
as Europeans’.130 The Syrian refugee crisis has thus resulted in the emergence of a growing ‘emotional
experience’ and ‘the formation of an affective block between refugees and large parts of the German
population’.131 This suggests that the dissolution of the German border for hundreds of thousands of
Syrian refugees may also be considered a form of biopolitical governmentality that has had as its target
not only – and possibly not primarily – Syrian refugees, but the German population, its identity and self-
understanding through the care of its emotional well-being.
This biopolitical care of emotions, however, would not be sufﬁcient, alone, to explain the German
‘open-arms’ policy. Biopolitical questions concerning the biological well-being of the German
population have been equally central. They encompass the idea, championed by Angela Merkel in
her 2016 new year address, that ‘countries have always beneﬁted from successful immigration, both
economically and socially’,132 and the view of the CEO of Daimler, a major German automotive
125 Oliver Schmidtke, ‘Why Germany is taking in so many refugees – the beneﬁts and risks?’, CBC News
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corporation, that: ‘Most refugees are young, well-educated, and highly motivated – just the sort of
people we are looking for’ (a view shared by numerous other large German companies).133 These
perspectives are the expression of a central biopolitical technology of government: managing and
regulating the demographic trends of the population in order to ensure a constant homeostasis
‘between resources and inhabitants’.134 From this perspective, it is essential to consider that
Germany’s population is declining and ageing. Whereas the population of the UK is rising steeply
(expected to rise from 64.1 to 80.1 million by 2060), Germany’s is falling (expected to shrink from
81.3 to 70.8 in 2060).135 As a result, ‘the dependency ratio (the proportion of expensive older people
in the population relative to able-bodied, tax-generating workers) is rising much quicker in Germany
than in the UK’.136
Hence, according to a report published by the Centre for European Economic Research, for
Germany to be able to continue to provide support for non-working older people, it will need to have
an annual net immigration of more than 200,000 skilled or semi-skilled people.137 This is expected
to result in a signiﬁcant economic gain considering that, in 2012, the 6.6 million foreign residents
living in Germany generated a surplus (more taxes paid than social transfers received) of 22 billion
euros, which is expected to reach 147.9 billion euros over their remaining life cycle.138 As German
economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel stated, ‘If we manage to quickly train those that come to us and to
get them into work, then we will solve one of our biggest problems for the economic future of our
country’ and, German labour minister Andrea Nahles remarked, ‘We will proﬁt from this, too.’139
This argument has been explicitly couched in biological terms by ﬁnance Minister Wolfgang
Schäuble, who warned that ‘[s]ealing ourselves off [from migrants] is what would ruin us, leaving us
to degenerate through inbreeding’,140 thus framing migration as an opportunity to strengthen the
German ‘race’ (in biopolitical terms).
This biopolitical concern with the material well-being of the German population clearly illustrates
the connections between neoliberal accumulation and biological reproduction – the inscription of
bodies ‘into systems of efﬁcient and economic controls’ described by Foucault – and how they are
employed as a means to govern an ageing population and ensure its biological ﬂourishing and
well-being. This argument does not suggest that the biopolitical governmentality of emotions
previously discussed is merely derivative of biological preoccupations, but rather that emotional and
biological concerns should be considered mutually supporting and reinforcing forces at the heart of
the biopolitical governmentality of populations. This does not mean that the result is a seamless
133
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biopolitical regime of government that eschews contradictions. Indeed, Merkel has been the object
of growing internal criticism from multiple sectors of society which see the signiﬁcant inﬂux of
refugees as a threat to German national identity, cohesion and well-being – that is, to use Foucault’s
terminology, as a threat to the German ‘race’ – with the effect that support for the ‘open door’ policy
has partially declined. Equally, some European countries have accused Germany’s open door policy
of exacerbating the crisis by providing migrants with a further incentive to relocate to Europe, thus
further endangering the European ‘race’. These tensions, however, have not undermined the
biological and emotional rationalities of care at the heart of the humanitarian government of Syrian
refugees. These rationalities have prompted the dissolution of borders for hundreds of thousands of
them, and their reclassiﬁcation from ‘undocumented migrants’ to ‘valuable’ members of society who
will contribute to furthering Germany’s moral, emotional, and material well-being.
In the case of the UK, the humanitarian government of Syrian refugees has resulted in a much more
limited reappraisal of the meaning and boundaries of biopolitical race. Their evaluation as valuable
members of society who could positively contribute to the emotional well-being of the British
population has been counterbalanced by their disqualiﬁcation as valuable from a biological
perspective in view of Britain’s different demographic trends. Accordingly, the combined emotional
and biological biopolitical apparatus has redrawn the racial divide between who must live and who
must die by excluding able-bodied migrants (deemed unnecessary to support the British economy
and its welfare provisions), and by including a small number of extremely vulnerable subjects who
look like Alan Kurdi and who could satisfy the British population’s emotional need of understanding
itself as compassionate, capable of empathising with distant strangers, and capable of fulﬁlling its
‘moral responsibilities’, as David Cameron put it. As in the case of Germany, this biopolitical
governmentality has not eschewed criticism. A vast array of internal and external voices has accused
the UK of not fulﬁlling its moral obligations given its economic and political strength, which would
enable it to accommodate a more substantial number of refugees. At the same time, the UK approach
has also garnered appreciation for ‘disciplining’ refugees, by teaching them that they should patiently
wait in camps to be rescued, and for seemingly discouraging migrants to come to Europe/the UK by
eliminating supposedly ‘pull factors’.141 This implicit validation of biopolitical racism, which
enthrones the UK with the power to decide who must live and who must die, ultimately has had as its
referent object the goal of enhancing the emotional and material well-being of the British population.
Conclusion
According to Foucault, pastoral power is both a massifying and an individualising power concerned
with the well-being of the whole ﬂock and of every individual sheep in the ﬂock. The shepherd has to
insure the material and spiritual well-being of the ﬂock in order to guide every single one of them to
salvation. This task, though, may require, ‘accepting the sacriﬁce of a sheep that could compromise
the whole. The sheep that is a cause of scandal, or whose corruption is in danger of corrupting the
whole ﬂock, must be abandoned, possibly excluded, chased away, and so forth’.142 The modern
rendering of this rationality of government, biopower, suggests that biopolitics is not just concerned
with the population as a whole – as Fassin argues – but also with individual lives. The UK decision to
141 This biopolitical governmentality has crucially informed the British reluctance to take unaccompanied minors
(who have not received the same media attention as Alan Kurdi) following the dismantling of Calais refugee
camp in October 2016.





take in a small number of children, women who had been raped, and men who suffered tortured
directly from Syrian camps displays a concern with individual lives and also suggests, beyond
existing accounts of humanitarian government, that the primary target of this biopolitics of care has
not been Syrian refugees, but the British population and its emotional well-being following the death
of Alan Kurdi.
The complementary dimension of this biopolitical governmentality of care is biopolitical racism. The
latter has been instrumental to account for the overwhelming majority of undocumented migrants
not cared for or left to die as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers – true suffering refugees should patiently wait in
camps to be rescued – and therefore as the embodiment of an ‘inferior race’ coming to Britain to steal
jobs and undermine the social and cultural cohesion of the population, and as responsible for their
own destiny. As in Foucault’s description of the logics of pastoral power, the unwanted migrants
threaten to corrupt ‘the whole ﬂock, [and therefore] must be abandoned, possibly excluded, [and]
chased away’. Conversely, in the case of Germany, a different demographic trend combined with
different historical circumstances has contributed to a biopolitical evaluation of Syrian refugees as
‘valuable lives’ that could contribute to the emotional and material well-being of the German
population. In this case, caring for large numbers of migrants has emerged as instrumental to
promote and maximize the life of the population as whole, both in biological and emotional terms.
Crucial for the development of these arguments has been a ‘differentialist’ understanding of
biopolitical racism, which highlighted how the ‘border’ that separates ‘superior’ and ‘inferior races’
is a tool of the biopolitical governmentality of population, rather than what delimitates its space of
action. This border can be redrawn to include ‘valuable’ lives, that is, lives deemed instrumental to
promote and enhance the biological and emotional life of the population. Accordingly, this article
has argued that humanitarian government should be understood not just as the government and care
of disenfranchised collectivities such as refugees, but also, and possibly more importantly, as the
biopolitical governmentality and care of host populations through the humanitarian government of
refugees.
This argument suggests a number of possible avenues for future research. In particular, it calls for a
deeper understanding of the complexities and multiple signiﬁcations that characterise the concept of
biopolitics, and for a deeper understanding of the role that the ‘care of souls’ and the mobilisation
and government of emotions play in the biopolitical governmentality of populations. This per-
spective, in turn, invites us to reconsider the emphasis placed by existing scholarship on feelings
of uncertainty, fear, contingency, anxiety, and insecurity. While the latter play a key role in the
biopolitical (in)securitisation of life143 and in the related construction of neoliberal subjects,144 the
promotion of enjoyment, of positive feelings, and of morally rewarding emotions aimed at enhancing
the self-appreciation of the population is an equally central focus of the biopolitical governmentality
of populations.
This approach raises new questions on the biopolitical governmentality of the European refugee
crisis and on who is actually being saved. There is no doubt that the goal of humanitarian gov-
ernment is saving the lives of refugees and undocumented migrants and that, as existing scholarship
has highlighted, this politics of life is riddled with tensions, contradictions, paradoxes, and
143 See Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, ‘Biopolitics of security in the 21st century’; ‘The biopolitical imaginary of
species-being’.
144 See Evans and Reid, Resilient Life; Chandler and Reid, The Neoliberal Subject.




autoimmune tendencies which ultimately reveal the limits of the humanitarian ethos and the thrust of
securitising rationalities at the heart of existing policies. However, as I have argued in this article, the
humanitarian government of refugees may not just be about saving some of them while securitising
the rest, but also about ‘saving’ host populations; it may be a self-referential, self-centred – and, in
different degrees, a self-absolutory – act of care. From this perspective, the tensions between care and
security highlighted by existing scholarship should not be considered solely as the expression of a
paradox or as the limit of the humanitarian ethos, but as the rational deployment of a technology of
government that frames the life of disenfranchised refugees as valuable only to the extent that it can
contribute to the emotional and biological life of the host population.
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